

**THE CHANGING SOCIOECONOMIC LOCATION OF BLACKS IN POSTWAR AMERICA**  
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The 1950s ended on a note of tranquility at home and peace abroad. To be sure, unemployment had been rising through the Eisenhower years, but the overall trend was far from linear, having been through a series of troughs and booms. Utopia had not yet been achieved, but as we entered the 1960s a youthful President was to excite the imagination of many to believe it was in our grasp. As we entered the new decade, there were at best only distant murmurs of the turmoil and crises it would contain: escalation of an unpopular war abroad; assassinations of a President, a Presidential contender, and a Nobel laureate among others; campus disruptions; and major riots in the streets of our cities. Although events seemed disorderly at the time, from the vantage point of the 1970s it is easy to see that the conflicts of the 1960s can at least be interpreted largely as manifestations of latent issues as old as the nation itself, to wit, social and, in particular, racial equality at home and isolation vs. internationalism in foreign affairs.

There is no orderly social theory which enables us to determine the conditions under which latent tensions become manifest conflicts. Open conflict is, however, like a sore on the social body and it inevitably brings forth efforts to ameliorate the conditions which gave rise to it. In itself, manifest conflict is neither good nor bad; like adultery it is only good or bad within a particular scheme of values. As with diseases, we cannot predict too well when social conflict will besiege us. Similarly, modest conflicts, like minor symptoms, may well unravel major ills which can be corrected before their consequences are fatal.

There is scant doubt that a rising tide of civil rights protest in the early 1960s was followed in the Johnson years by the most significant efforts to secure the equal rights of citizens through federal legislation since the Civil War. We cannot, of course, be certain that the latent racial tensions heated up by the civil rights movement were the proximate cause of subsequent Congressional activity. Similarly, we are at a loss to identify why a significant civil rights movement came to fruition in the 1960s rather than decades before. What we can do, however, is examine the changing socioeconomic location of blacks through the decade. Such an endeavor does not enable us to pinpoint the specific causes of any observed changes, but it does enable us to assess in a global way the consequences of a turbulent decade upon the relative socioeconomic position of our black citizens.

**POSTWAR TRENDS IN THE SOCIOECONOMIC  
STATUS OF BLACKS**

The absolute level of living experienced by blacks has been rising for some time, for as real income has risen in our expanding economy everyone's standard of living has improved, even those groups whose share in the total dividends of our society is less than their relative size. There

is now appreciable evidence that through the 1960s the socioeconomic circumstances of blacks improved both absolutely and relatively (Farley and Hermalin, 1972; Freeman, 1973; Wattenberg and Scammon, 1973). Some of the evidence on this matter is summarized graphically in Figure 1, which shows for the postwar period the time path of (1) the ratio of nonwhite to white median family income and (2) the index of occupational dissimilarity between employed whites and nonwhites.<sup>1</sup> The indices of dissimilarity were computed over the major occupation groups of the U.S. Bureau of the Census; the index values represent the percentage of blacks (or of whites) who would have to shift their major occupational group in order to effect equality in the occupational distributions of the two races.

As can be seen from Figure 1, the relative family income of nonwhites is fairly stable through the 1950s at a figure just over half that of white median family income. However, through the 1960s, nonwhite family income expanded more rapidly than white family income so that it now stands at over three-fifths the level enjoyed by whites. Whether it was the result of civil rights activity, of equal employment opportunity legislation, of the poverty program, or some other innovation of the 1960s we cannot say, but evidently there were forces at work in the past decade, not operative in the more distant past, which led to a relative improvement in the economic position of black families.

The indices of occupational dissimilarity reveal a decline in the level of occupational segregation which parallels the rise in the relative family income of blacks. Thus, relative income gains were fortified by movements in the direction of occupational equality. Unfortunately, we are unable to create annual series, disaggregated by sex, measuring the relative occupational position of blacks. Somewhat more piecemeal data from scattered time points was, however, assembled by Farley and Hermalin (1972, p. 363). Their figures show that both the occupational segregation of employed black men from white males and the occupational segregation of employed black women from employed white females evidenced little change through the 1950s, but declined in the 1960s. Relatively greater gains were made by black women vis à vis white women than by black men relative to their white counterparts.

All of the foregoing results are, of course, based on gross differences between whites and nonwhites. Only a fraction of the gross differences between blacks and whites in economic and occupational outcomes can be traced to racial inequalities in economic and occupational opportunities. The gross differences conceal important differences between the races not only in access to opportunities, but also in attainment. Blacks, for example, are concentrated in the South where incomes are lower and have levels of educational attainment inferior on the average to those of whites. These factors, among others,

suffice to explain part of the observed gross differences between whites and black in both occupational and economic outcomes. It also happens that blacks have been moving toward educational equality with whites during the period under consideration (cf. Farley and Hermalin, p. 364), while assuming at the same time a population distribution by region which increasingly resembles that of whites. Consequently, it is just possible that the relatively improving occupational and economic circumstances of blacks may be traced, among other things, to their regional redistribution and improving educational attainment relative to whites, rather than to any substantial alteration of their occupational and educational opportunities during the turbulent 1960s.

#### MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF INCOME

In order to assess the possibilities set forth above, one needs to move from the analysis of gross racial differences in socioeconomic outcomes to the examination of net differences in income and occupational status, adjusted for such salient correlates of income and occupation as age, education, and region of residence. To do this, one needs to specify a model of income determination at the individual level and estimate this model in successive time periods. Published tabulations from the 1960 and 1970 Censuses of Population enable us to estimate a reasonable approximation to such a model at the beginning and end of the 1960s.

For the male experienced civilian labor force aged 25-64 in 1960, we estimated the following model:

$$Y_i = \bar{Y} + \sum_{j=1}^2 \alpha_j R_{ji} + \sum_{k=1}^5 \beta_k E_{ki} + \sum_{r=1}^{11} \gamma_r P_{ri} + \sum_{s=1}^3 \lambda_s A_{si} + \sum_{t=1}^2 \pi_t G_{ti} + \epsilon_i \quad (\text{Eq. 1})$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^2 R_{ji} = \sum_{k=1}^5 E_{ki} = \sum_{r=1}^{11} P_{ri} = \sum_{s=1}^3 A_{si} = \sum_{t=1}^2 G_{ti} = 1, \text{ for all } i, \quad (\text{Eq. 2})$$

and

$$\sum_{j=1}^2 \alpha_j \bar{R}_j = \sum_{k=1}^5 \beta_k \bar{E}_k = \sum_{r=1}^{11} \gamma_r \bar{P}_r =$$

$$\sum_{s=1}^3 \lambda_s \bar{A}_s = \sum_{t=1}^2 \pi_t \bar{G}_t = 0, \quad (\text{Eq. 3})$$

where (1)  $Y_i$  is the 1959 income of the  $i$ th person, (2)  $\bar{Y}$  is the mean of the  $Y_i$ 's, (3) the  $R_{ji}$ 's,  $E_{ki}$ 's,  $P_{ri}$ 's,  $A_{si}$ 's, and  $G_{ti}$ 's are sets of dummy variables taking on the values zero and one which describe, respectively, a respondent's race, years of school completed, major occupational group, age, and region of residence, (4) the  $\bar{R}_j$ 's,  $\bar{E}_k$ 's,  $\bar{P}_r$ 's,  $\bar{A}_s$ 's, and  $\bar{G}_t$ 's are the means of the respective dummy variables and, hence, are equivalent, respectively, to the proportions of the studied sample belonging to the  $j$ th race,  $k$ th educational category,  $r$ th major occupation group,  $s$ th age category, and  $t$ th region, (5)  $\epsilon_i$  is a random variable with mean zero, and (6) the  $\alpha_j$ 's,  $\beta_k$ 's,  $\gamma_r$ 's,  $\lambda_s$ 's, and  $\pi_t$ 's are the coefficients we wish to estimate.

There is nothing particularly novel about this model; it is stated in the general form of a multiple classification analysis (Melichar, 1965) wherein the 1959 income of the  $i$ th person is treated as an additive function of his race, years of school completed, major occupational group, age, and region of residence. Equation 1 merely states this model; Equation 2 sets forth five logical identities which exist between the predictor variables, and Equation 3 sets forth the identifying restrictions which enable one to estimate the model, given the identities stated in Equation 2. The model is wholly analogous to dummy variable analysis (Suits, 1957) save that the coefficients associated with the predictor categories appear as net deviations from the grand mean rather than as net deviations from an implicitly omitted category.

A model nearly identical to that set forth above was estimated with 1969 income as the dependent variable for the male experienced civilian labor force aged 25-64 in 1970. There are three minor differences between the two models, save from whatever differences are incurred by the relative quality of the two censuses. First, the 1970 tabulations enable one to contrast Negroes and whites, while the 1960 results pertain to whites and nonwhites. Second, while the major occupational categories remain identical in title (after combining "operatives, except transport" with "transport equipment operatives" in 1970 to form "operatives and kindred workers" and similarly combining "service workers, except private household" with "private household workers" in 1970 to form "service workers") there are nevertheless changes in the job content of the major occupational groups between the two censuses. Finally, all 1970 occupational returns were allocated, so an "occupation not reported" category appears in the 1960 analysis, but not in the one for 1970. We doubt if these modest changes are likely to alter appreciably any major differences observed between the two analyses.

The results of the multiple classification analyses are shown in Table 1, which also gives the coefficients observed in the analysis of 1959 income in terms of estimated 1969 dollars. The transformation of the 1959 results into estimated 1969 dollars was achieved by inflating them by the ratio of the consumer price index in 1959 to that for 1969. If one compares the 1959 results when expressed in 1969 dollars with those observed for the later year, it is evident that overall pattern of results is much the same for the two periods. To be sure, 1959 coefficients, even when adjusted to 1969 dollars, are not precisely the same as those derived from the 1970 census data. However, many of these differences are to be explained by the simple principle that if the real income of two groups rises by a common proportion (rather than a fixed amount) the absolute difference in their income levels will likewise increase. For example, there appears to be some widening of regional income differences between 1959 and 1969, but it turns out this widening is more apparent than real since their relative incomes were in fact converging slightly. We can read from Table 1 that net income of Southerners, adjusted for race, age, education, and occupation, was \$6586 (= \$7354 - \$768) in 1959, expressed in 1969 dollars. The corresponding figure in 1969 was \$8757 (= \$9579 - \$822) or roughly a (100)  $(\$8757 - \$6586)/(\$6586) = 32.9$  percent rise in purchasing power. Similar calculations for those living in the North and West reveals a roughly estimated rise in purchasing power of 29.6 percent. Thus, while the absolute income differential between the North and South, adjusted for race, age, education, and occupation, was increasing, their relative incomes were for all practical purposes stable.

Not all of the differences between the 1959 coefficients, as expressed in 1969 dollars, and those for 1969 can be understood by the fact that proportional increases in real income also increase absolutely the between group variance in mean levels. Among the more notable changes which cannot be explained in this way is the fact that the net income of high school graduates, adjusted for race, region, age, and occupation, slips from nearly two hundred dollars above the grand mean to more than two hundred dollars below it a decade later. A similar slippage of lesser magnitude is observed in the relative income position of craftsmen. In addition, the coefficients for the age categories suggest, albeit weakly, the opportunity advantages being experienced by the small Depression cohort as it moves through its life cycle (cf. Winsborough, 1972). Doubtless one might tease other small changes from the results, but to do so would only further distract us from our primary focus on racial differences.

#### THE INCOME POSITION OF BLACKS

One can compute from the results displayed in Table 1 that the net difference between the income of whites and nonwhites,<sup>2</sup> adjusted for occupation, education, age, and region of resi-

dence, stood at \$1213 in 1959. Converting this figure to 1969 dollars yields a racial income gap of \$1536, which may be compared with the net differential of \$1671 observed in 1969. Thus, in so far as we can ascertain, the absolute net income differential between black and white males in the experienced civilian labor force, aged 25-64, was expanding slightly through the 1960s. The observed shift appears to us, however, as well within the bounds of sampling and judgmental error, particularly in the selection of price indices to inflate the 1959 coefficients. For all practical purposes, then, the absolute net differential in the purchasing power of blacks and whites was about the same in 1969 as a decade earlier.

Paradoxical as it may seem, while the absolute net income differential between blacks and whites was, if anything, expanding, the relative income position of black males in the experienced civilian labor force, aged 25-64, was improving. We already know from the results presented in Figure 1 that gross, unadjusted nonwhite family income was improving relative to that of white family income. The present claim, however, refers to the relative income of black males in the experienced civilian labor force aged 25-64, adjusted for occupation, education, age, and region of residence. Nonetheless, the point is easy to see: given that the absolute net income differential was close to constant and the real incomes of both blacks and whites rose, the relative income position of blacks, adjusted for the variables considered here, must necessarily rise. The easiest way to see this phenomenon statistically is to express the adjusted income differential between the races as a fraction of average black income. In 1959, the adjusted income differential between white and nonwhite males aged 25-64 and in the experienced civilian labor force amounted to 35 percent of average income of nonwhite black males in the same age and employment categories. The corresponding figure for 1969, which contrasts whites and blacks rather than whites and nonwhites is 28 percent. Thus, even after adjustment for such salient features of individual income determination as occupation, education, age, and region of residence, the income position of black males is improving relative to their white counterparts. To summarize, through the 1960s, the real income of blacks and their income relative to whites was increasing, but at the same time the absolute difference in the average purchasing power of blacks and whites was certainly not declining, and may have been expanding slightly.

#### ON THE COST OF BEING BLACK

There is a real temptation to regard the adjusted differences between black and white income in the two periods as a plausible indicator of the cost of being black. Were one to take this step, as Siegel (1965) does with admirable caution,<sup>3</sup> one could only conclude from the evidence at hand that the tax for being black was virtually constant through the 1960s.

There are, however, some perils in taking the leap which Siegel made.

First, one needs to recognize that any adjusted income differential between blacks and whites is no better than the model upon which it is based. To assert that any particular adjusted differential represents the cost of being black is tantamount to asserting that the model from which the estimate is derived is itself correctly specified. Unfortunately, in the nonexperimental sciences there is no way of determining this matter definitively. For example, we have here adjusted the racial income differential for occupation, education, age, and region of residence. Even these controls have been less than exact, since the control on age is crude and it is well known that blacks are occupationally segregated within, as well as between major occupation groups. More importantly, however, there are other variables upon which whites and blacks differ, but which the census tabulations do not permit us to control. Among these, one would surely number measured intelligence, health status, parental socioeconomic status, and various characteristics of one's family of origin, including its size and stability. Short of introducing these variables into the analysis, there is no way of knowing whether the adjusted means discussed herein would be stable. Even if these variables were controlled, which it might be possible to do by augmenting census derived covariance matrices from other sources, one could not be certain that some further unspecified variable is lurking in the background, yet to be discovered. In sum, any effort to interpret a particular set of adjusted mean differences between the income of blacks and whites as an indicator of the "cost of being black" will be hard to defend substantively.

Despite the problems noted above, it is patently clear that examination of the movement of adjusted means, such as those examined herein, is far superior to working with gross differences since one has at least ruled out some of the more plausible explanations of the improving, relative income position of blacks, such as the increasing similarity in the educational, occupational, and regional distributions of blacks and whites. Indeed, in the light of what we now know, a plausible case could be made for accepting the figures at hand as reasonable indicators of the "cost of being black"--a phrase we interpret to mean that part of the gross racial differential in economic status which can be traced neither to average racial differentials in individual ability nor aptitude and which, therefore, must be allocated to the operation of discrimination, differential opportunities, or institutional racism. For example, Duncan (1969) provides a somewhat more complete model of income determination for deriving adjusted differences in the income levels of blacks and whites. After adjusting for the socioeconomic level of family of origin (head's education and occupation), number of siblings, measured mental ability, education, and occupation, Duncan still finds

for 25-34 year old males in 1964 an adjusted racial differential in income on the order of \$1200 to \$1400. This figure is roughly on the same order of magnitude as the ones reported herein and suggests that the racial income gap, as adjusted here, may well be recalcitrant to downward revision on incorporation of the most obvious missing variables.

A second difficulty in interpreting adjusted racial differentials in income as indicators of the "cost of being black" flows from the fact that discrimination is multidimensional. Blacks incur "costs" at every step in the career cycle. Income is but one of many foci of discrimination. Consequently, that part of the gross racial differential in income which is washed away by factoring out, say, occupation or education may itself be a product of discriminatory practices directed not at limiting the specifically economic horizons of blacks, but their occupational and educational ones.<sup>4</sup>

On balance, we feel it is the better part of wisdom to disassociate adjusted racial differentials in income from a terminology involving "costs." Instead, such adjusted differentials should be treated as nothing more nor less than what they are: hypothetical calculations of what the income gap would be if the races were equated on the factors considered in making the adjustments. If there are no suppressor variables at work, i.e., factors whose inclusion would widen rather than reduce the adjusted differentials, then one can consider the adjusted differentials as an upper bound on the "costs" to blacks of discrimination with respect to the variable under investigation. In this sense, one might venture that in 1969 income discrimination "cost" blacks no more than \$1700. That, however, is not a very strong statement, and one is on risky ground in going beyond it.

#### TOWARD INCOME EQUALITY OF THE RACES

Among the many summary conclusions ventured by Farley and Hermalin in their review of changes in racial inequality during the 1960s was the statement (1972, p. 33), "Though the progress of the '60s appears rapid in a number of respects, it does not, in our opinion, presage a short run end to racial differences in income, occupation, or education." There is no denying that the relative socioeconomic location of blacks was improving through the 1960s; there is also no denying that these relative gains represent a significant change in the American social order for the simple reason that the record of the more distant past is one of absolute gains for everyone and scant, if any, relative gains for the black subpopulation. Nevertheless, these real changes hold forth scant hope, as Farley and Hermalin surmise, of any early demise in racial inequality.

This point can be developed a little more formally than Farley and Hermalin present it.

Let  $\bar{N}_t$  and  $\bar{W}_t$  be the average incomes of blacks and whites, respectively, in year  $t$ ;  $\bar{N}_{t+10}$  and  $\bar{W}_{t+10}$ , the corresponding means a decade later;  $k$ , the annual rate of inflation;  $r_n$ , the annual rate of real income growth for blacks, and  $r_w$ , the annual rate of real income growth for whites. With these definitions, we have the following identities:

$$\bar{N}_t (1 + k)^{10} (1 + r_n)^{10} = \bar{N}_{t+10} \quad (\text{Eq. 5})$$

and

$$\bar{W}_t (1 + k)^{10} (1 + r_w)^{10} = \bar{W}_{t+10} \quad (\text{Eq. 6})$$

Taking the ratio of these equations and setting  $x = (1 + r_n)^{10} / (1 + r_w)^{10}$ , we have

$$x = (\bar{W}_t \bar{N}_{t+10}) / (\bar{N}_t \bar{W}_{t+10}). \quad (\text{Eq. 7})$$

With  $z = x^{(1/10)}$ , the equation,

$$(\bar{N}_{t+10}) / (\bar{W}_{t+10}) z^Y = 1, \quad (\text{Eq. 8})$$

may be solved for the number of years ( $=y$ ) it will take for racial equality of income to be reached, given the rates of real income growth,  $r_n$  and  $r_w$ , for blacks and whites.

Setting  $t = 1959$  and using the average incomes of black and white males in 1959 and 1969, solution of the above equations reveal that, given the implicit differential real income growth of blacks and whites through the 1960s, racial equality in income, at least for males aged 25-64 in the experienced civilian labor force, would be achieved in 2015. Working with the income figures adjusted for age, region of residence, education, and occupation yields a virtually identical estimate. Thus, were the relative real income growth of blacks and whites observed in the 1960s to persist into the indefinite future, black males in the experienced civilian labor force aged 25-64 would achieve income equality with their white counterparts about 150 years after Emancipation.

Barring any appreciable upward drift in the real income growth of blacks relative to that of whites, such a forecast proves, upon examination, to be very optimistic. If there is any one thing we know about the economy, it is surely that blacks are more severely affected by business cycles than whites (cf., Hodge, 1973), the colloquial expression for this phenomenon being "last hired, first fired." We know of no basis for predicting the end of the business cycle and, consequently, it is almost dead certain that the rate of increase in real income experienced by blacks through the 1960s will be attenuated if the energy crisis or any other factor moves us into a recession of any magnitude. Even if the experience of blacks during the 1960s was not an artifact of the Viet Nam War, the cyclical nature of economic activity will almost surely push, given current social arrangements, the date at which racial equality of income is achieved well beyond 2015.

In so far as we see, the prospect of economic equality for blacks lies, if it exists at all, in the very distant future. At this juncture, it seems reasonably clear that differential opportunity structures are not the primary source of social inequality at large (cf. Jencks, et al., 1972). If one of our societal goals is to reduce the level of social inequality, it seems fairly certain we will not be successful if national policymakers continue to dabble with equal opportunity programs, rather than formulating and enacting an effective scheme of income redistribution. For our own part, we are convinced that whether or not a policy engendering a substantial redistribution of income is a reasonable one, it is the only certain way to achieve greater equality in the short run, including racial equality of income.

Effecting racial equality of income is, in fact, a modest goal compared to that of achieving a greater degree of economic equality across the board. The calculations presented in Table 1 imply, for example, that were black and white males aged 25-64 in the experienced civilian labor force in 1970 to achieve equivalent regional, age, educational, and occupational distribution, a national tax of \$143 levied on every white male in the labor force and redistributed to the corresponding black population would suffice to affect income equality between the races. Were the tax levied only on those white males with incomes of \$10,000 or more, it would amount to \$370; restricting it to those with incomes in excess of \$15,000 would put the figure at roughly \$1100. These are not huge sums; even President Nixon can afford them, though you'd never guess it from his income tax returns.

No one, of course, seriously proposes that race be made a basis of taxation, though, in fact marital status and assorted other social characteristics already are. The point, however, is clear enough: we can achieve something close to racial equality of income in this country. To do so requires a program which insures that some income which now flows to whites be redirected to blacks. Since whites are such a preponderant majority, a small per capita "cost" on their part yields a large per capita "benefit" among blacks. Something less than fifty cents a day is a small, very small price to pay for the realization of something close to the American dream for our black citizens. Just shelling it out, however, will not be enough; we will also need policymakers and elected officials committed to constructing a bureaucratic structure for redistributing dollars rather than opportunities.

#### COMMENTS

We began this paper by observing that the major issues which divided the turbulent 1960s revolved around the older themes of equality, particularly racial equality, and isolationism. Obviously, domestic activity on the civil rights front stands as a potential cause of the observed changes in the socioeconomic location of blacks

in the postwar period. International relations and foreign wars seem, on the surface, remote from internal affairs. We would like to conclude by suggesting that, not only the civil rights movement at home, but the Viet Nam involvement abroad is an important key to understanding the modest relative advances experienced by blacks during the 1960s.

Nearly everyone agrees that the business cycle is a key factor in understanding the relative position of blacks. We find, over the period 1954-72, that the total unemployment rate had a correlation of  $-.50$  with the ratio of nonwhite to white median family income and an association of  $.29$  with the indices of occupational segregation reported above. These relationships are to be expected. Linking them to the Viet Nam encounter only requires one to see that the defense establishment is one potential vehicle for managing the volume of the domestic labor force. We find, in fact, over the period at hand that the ratio of armed force personnel to the total labor force is correlated  $-.43$  with the total unemployment rate, a finding which begins to suggest how the domestic situation of blacks during the 1960s may have been affected by the confrontation in Viet Nam. These correlations are not, of course, decisive and, indeed, our efforts to incorporate them in a more complex scheme of causal relations has been unsuccessful. Given the crude quality of the indicators, the results remain suggestive. To the extent that the relative improvement in the socioeconomic location of blacks in recent years was tied to the consequences of our involvement in Viet Nam, the future of American blacks may be considerably less rosy than the experience of the 1960s suggests--and that was not all that rosy to begin with.

Acknowledgment: Many of the ideas discussed in this paper were developed under a grant from the National Science Foundation (#GS-1397, "Assimilation of Minorities into the Labor Force"). The calculations reported herein were supported by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation. The support of these institutions is gratefully acknowledged, as is that of our colleague, Ricardo Klorman, none of whom bear any responsibility for errors this report may contain or necessarily share the views expressed herein. This paper is dedicated to K. C. Tyree, who is segregated in his own way.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The ratios of nonwhite to white median family income are taken, for 1947-71, from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972, Table 11, p. 34. The figure for 1972 comes from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973b, Table 8, p. 6. For 1947-59, the indices of occupational segregation were compiled from various government publications. The values for subsequent years were computed from U.S. Department of Labor, 1973, Table A-11, p. 141,

and Table A-12, p. 143. The indices of occupational segregation are afflicted by two major incomparabilities. The figures for 1960 and later years include Alaska and Hawaii and are based on employed persons aged 16 and over, while the earlier figures exclude Alaska and Hawaii and are based on employed persons aged 14 and over. The figures for 1971 and 1972 are not exactly comparable to those for earlier years owing to changes in the definition of the major occupational groups over which the indices are computed; other, more modest changes of this sort afflict the series at other points.

<sup>2</sup>The analysis for 1959 is based on the contrast of whites and nonwhites, while that for 1969 compares whites with blacks. Consequently, nonwhite, non-Negroes are included in the earlier analysis and excluded from the latter.

<sup>3</sup>Siegel's work is plainly the inspiration for the present paper; though portions of his paper have been superseded by Duncan's seminal work (1969), his endeavor remains one of the best informed and sophisticated analyses of the economic position of American blacks and continues to stand as a model of scientific reporting.

<sup>4</sup>Reflection upon this paragraph may well convince the reader that as plausible a case can be made for interpreting the gross income difference between blacks and whites as an indicator of the "cost of being black" as can be made for any alternative indicator. The name of our game is decomposition, not labelling.

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FIGURE 1. TRENDS IN THE RELATIVE FAMILY INCOME AND OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION OF WHITES AND NONWHITES, 1947-1972.

TABLE ONE - MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSES OF 1959 AND 1969 INCOMES  
OF MALES, AGE 25-64, IN THE EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE.

CATEGORY	1959	IN 1969 DOLLARS	
		1959	1969
MEANS			
TOTAL	5847 <sup>2</sup>	7354	9579 <sup>3</sup>
White	6112	7687	9920
Non-White <sup>1</sup>	3260	4108	5936
ADJUSTED DEVIATIONS FROM GRAND MEAN			
<u>Race</u>			
White	113	142	143
Non-White	-1108	-1394	-1528
<u>Years of School Completed</u>			
0 - 8 Years Elementary School	-1183	-1488	-2112
1 - 3 Years High School	373	469	-1039
4 Years High School	146	184	-215
1 - 3 Years College	770	968	668
4 or more Years College	3401	4278	4100
<u>Age</u>			
25 - 34	-908	-1142	-1506
35 - 54	367	462	703
55 - 64	280	352	279
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional, Technical & Kindred Workers	830	1044	1261
Managers and Administrators, except farm	2834	3564	3098
Sales Workers	592	745	1088
Clerical and Kindred Workers	-701	-882	-1150
Craftsmen and Kindred Workers	28	35	-142
Operatives	-502	-631	-993
Laborers, except farm	-1180	-1484	-1754
Farmers and Farm Managers	-1942	-2443	-2273
Farm Laborers & Farm Foremen	-2547	-3203	-3739
Service Workers	-1290	-1622	-2141
Occupation not Reported			
<u>Region</u>			
North and West	238	299	341
South	-611	-768	-822

<sup>1</sup> In the 1960 Census the category "non-white" is used. In the 1970 Census the category "Negro" is used.

<sup>2</sup> Grand Mean for all males in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1963), Table I.

<sup>3</sup> Weighted mean of the total white and total Negro means from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1973a), Tables I & II.

SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1963, 1973a).